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THE SEVERANCE TAX AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTERTEMPORAL EQUITY 
Talbot Page* 
It is possible to imagine a boundary between the economy 
and the environment. Crossing one way, materials are appropriated 
and extracted from the environment and put to use in the economy. 
In the course of processing and use, materials recross the boundary 
as wastes and pollutants. The management of pollution problems and 
the resolution of issues of depletion and intertemporal equity both 
occur at this boundary.!/ Economics has by and large confined its 
attention to the economy side of the boundary, while ecology has 
focused on the environment side. The role of the boundary and the 
flows across it, while recognized, has not yet been well-integrated 
into either discipline, which is not surprising since the boundary 
area overlaps the two domains. And, although there are increasing 
efforts to control pollution and rapidly increasing literature on 
the economics of pollution, the flow of materials across the 
boundary is, generally speaking, set by the rules of the market, 
largely unconstrained by considerations of ecology or intertemporal 
equity_.�/ This article considers a policy instrument which operates 
directly at the boundary -- the ad valorem severance tax. 
* Talbot Page is a Research Associate in Economics, Environmental 
Quality Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena 
California. 
A severance tax, which is a tax on material extr 
from the environment valued at or near the point of extrlc
has the incentive effects of increasing materials conse�a 
increasing recycling (by raising the price of virgin matlrial I 
cted 
ion, 
ion, 
relative to scrap material), and increasing product durabi 
The ad valorem version is essentially an excise tax (or l 
based sales tax) and is close to a mirror image of the plr 
depletion allowance, which is also based on gross value bf 
material at or near the"mine mouth." But the depletion l1 
is "negative sales tax" representing a subsidy on a mateli 
price instead of a tax on it. 
When I began Conservation and Economic Efficienc 
occurred to me that a conventional neoclassical economi1 a 
would prescribe against both the severance tax and the dep I 
allowance equally, on the grounds that both lead to ineffi 
ity. 
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Yet it seemed to me that there might emerge a useful,roJe 
the severance tax if the neoclassical perspective were Jro
to include the intertemporal equities involved in the lJng 
use of the resource base. In this chapter I will first lskbtch 
ole three of the ways this might be done and then discuss tlie 
of the severance tax within this broader context. ReexLi 
of the present value criterion}_/ by which the market, seJs 
flow of materials reveals some inadequacies and unresolJed! 
of the usual interpretations of the criterion and suggeltsl a 
issli' 
atid 
.he 
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rationale, based on equity considerations, for controlling the 
matter-energy flows across the boundary, while respecting market 
allocation of the limited flow among alternative uses once within 
the economy. 
THE PRESENT VALUE CRITERION 
In resource economics one often finds a criterion of 
the form: 
max I 0t-l 
(cl, c2' • . .  ) t=l 
U (ct) (1) 
such that (c1, c2, • • •  ) = c e E, where E is the intertemporal 
opportunity or feasibility set, and where ct is consumption at
time t, or more generally a description of this world at time 
or generation t, o the discount factor, and U (·) is a measure 
of social well-being or utility. For this criterion, the general 
form of the present value criterion, to have a claim for accepta-
bility, it must rest on some normative base. However, the normative 
base is rarely discussed, and to make matters more difficult, the 
units of the variables are typically not defined so that the 
interpretation of the criterion is ambiguous. There are two 
obvious interpretations of (1) and several justifications of its 
general form, none of which seem entirely satisfactory. 
In the first interpretation, (1) is a specialized form 
of the planner's criterion. In other words, we start by writing 
the planner's preference function: 
u U (c1, c2, • • •  , ct'''');
then it is assumed that U happens to be additively separatile 
u I Ut(ct) t=l 
where Ut (ct) is utility experienced by the planner in conte 
consumption c by the future generation t. The planner il 
to be altruis:ic toward the future, but not completely1 so l , I 
4 
lat 
sumJ 
planner values consumption in the present more than anticipalted 
consumption in the future by another generation. As a paltilcula11t 
simple way of specifying his declining altruism over time l ilt is 
further assumed that 
Ut (ct) 
ot-lU (ct)' 
which leads directly to (1). 
To focus'on the intertemporal problem, we a�sume 
and below that each generation acts like a single unit, sb 
ere 
hat 
the planner speaks for the whole first generation. Hencef, under 
the first interpretation the units are: 
t-lU (c ) 0 t Utility enjoyed by the present gen�ratlo 
in contemplating consumption ct by gener�-
tion t. 
" 
U (ct)
0 
Utility that the present generation would
enjoy if consumption ct would be moved back
in time to the present generation. 
The measure of the present generation's time 
preference, or in the intergenerational context 
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a measure of the present's altruism (its ability 
to feel utility from the contemplation of other 
generations' consumption). 
Thus, under the first interpretation (1) is the present generation's 
utility function. This interpretation is called selfish altruism -­
selfish because it is defined as the maximization of the present's 
utility; altruistic because the present experiences a contribution 
to its utility by contemplating consumption by other, later 
generations. 
Under the second interpretation, (1) is seen as the 
criterion of a neutral intertemporal observer, who is trying to 
be fair to all generations. In contrast, this interpretation is 
called disinterested fairness, because it results from an outside 
observer with no direct stake in the outcome, but with the desire 
to take the interests of all generations into account in some fair 
manner. The observer knows that if (1) is maximized with a zero 
discount rate (o = 1) and if there is productivity in the economy, 
satisfaction of the criterion with o = 1 requires that the earlier 
generations have lower levels of consumption than later generations.ii
The observer knows that in a baseline case with productivit 
but no technical change, pollution, resource depletion, ol I uncertainty -- discounting by the marginal productivity of
will lead to a maximization of (1) with an intertemporalli 
egalitarian consumption stream. For the second interpretkt 
motivated by a "baseline egalitarianism," we have 
6: 
apita 
on, 
U (ct) Utility enjoyed by generation t in consumifg lct. 
0 The marginal productivity of capital. 
Under the second interpretation (1) is weighted average o� 
across time with the weights chosen to lead to egalitarial 
under the baseline case. Of course, a criterion that .lea�s
egalitarian co�umpti� ,, �' very intereating; if thie r· 
tili[li 
:·1 
e all 
that is to the matter, it would be more direct to scrap ([) 
state the criterion as simply requiring intertemporally jga 
consumption. However, the situation offers richer possibl[il:l.ties 
when the second interpretation is preserved, but the cri�erion i� 
applied to cases where there is uncertianty, technical cJange, 
and II 
itarli.! 
pollution, and/or depletion. 
These two interpretations are conceptually distiinrt ani_ 
lead in different directions. The first interpretation Jas littll 
ethical appeal, if we are to take into account the interJsts of 
the future and the possibility that they may conflict wijh the 
s 
ion 
interests of the present. The second interpretation has lsote ap�f�l, 
although it is not clear what is the ethical strength·of a rite�[bn 
which is motivated by a baseline case and then applied to other, 
differing cases. Nonetheless, the second interpretation has 
normative aspects in the sense that it leads to comparisons of 
intertemporal Pareto improvements. In the interpretation of 
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disinterested fairness the utilities of present and future genera-
tions are defined so that it is possible to consider actions which 
make some generations better off without hurting others. It is 
possible to consider discount rate calculations in terms of poten­
tial Pareto improvements, intergenerationally, as well • .2/ But 
under the interpretation of selfish altruism, only the first 
generation's interests or utility is defined so that it is not 
possible to talk about potential Pareto improvements intergenera-
tionally. 
A. Consistency 
Consistency is a desirable property as each generation's 
resource endowment is treated as a sunk cost by that generation, 
and the present value criterion is consistent, as long as o is 
constant . .§/ However, there are other criteria, such as the overtaking 
principle, which are fundamentally different from the present 
value criterion but which are also consistent. The overtaking 
principle says that if, after some point in t:lnne, all 
generations unanimously prefer x to y, then the intertemporal 
social choice should be x, y. Thus the desirable property of 
consistency does not single out the present value criterion. 
Moreover, consistency is a limited property, because it treats 
the resource endowment passed on from one generation to another 
'I 
I $ 
as a sunk cost each time and consequently says nothing abouU the 
intertemporal equities involved. As an alternative, the lnuer­
temporal choice problem can be viewed in part as what opplrtjunity; 
set to pass on to the next generation. In this case the �rdblem 
. h i f . I I( is not to c oose an ent re sequence o actions or states 
I 
c ,c
2
,. 
but a pair (c1,E2
) where E
2 
is a "fair heritage" or opport ity I 
in the succeeding generation and c1 and E2 
are compatiblef In tJ
next generation the task is to choose a compatible (c
2
,E3�. As �· 
decision sequences do not overlap, there is no consis�enc� roblll 
in it• uo�l, fo<mal ,.,..e, although there �y be a �ed � llook 
further ahead than one generation to specify a "fair" 1opppr¢unity 
set for the next generation. 
In any·case, consistency is probably too na�ro
1 
a
condition. It does not allow, for example, the next genera 
to have a time preference (o) different from our own. TJe . I desirability of the condition is further blurred by the 
l
bs
tion that.any criterion is consistent for choosing over the 
(smaller) set of paths which later planners would not :modlf 
Thus, consistency is not an all-or-nothing property, but l 
more-or-less one. 
B. Markets 
It is sometimes suggested that (1) simply r�state 
markets tend to do by themselves. Unfortunately it i� sjil 
just what are the normative properties of sequential marJet 
ion 
rva-
LI 
wha. I I uncO 
eq•J 
_ _._.__.._._._.._, __ _ 
.r 
ria, 
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even if there is perfect foresight, when resource inheritance and 
depletion are endogenous. Most of the work on sequential market 
equilibria has focused on efficiency aspects. It appears that the 
simplest thing that can be said is that markets tend to maximize 
the wealth position of the present generation. From the truism 
that generally only one thing can be maximized at a time, it is 
clear that the interests of the future can be in conflict with 
those of the present. Resolution of this potential conflict is 
precisely the problem of intertemporal equity. Thus, to say that 
(1) is desirable as a criterion because it is in some way related 
to market behavior tells us little or nothing about the equities 
involved. 
C. Paternalism 
It is often argued that in an ultimate sense the present 
must be a dictator, because it is the only generation around to 
make choices. Thus, necessarily an intertemporal criterion must 
be an expression only of the present's preferences, including its 
intentions and altruism toward the future, and its estimates of 
conditions in the future. As a simple observation as to who is 
now living and who is yet unborn, this is true, but as we shall 
see this observation does not lead inexorably to the present value 
criterion. 
THE AGGREGATION PROBLEM 
The confining narrowness of the present val�e 
can be seen when the choice problem is put in the mor�
framework of social choice. As before, to focus 
problem we assume that each generation acts like 
intratemporal problem of aggregation of preferences has 
Each generation has its own preference structure over 
of the world, where a state is a whole time path from :
onward. As before, we can write a particular state or 
c = (c1,c2
, • • •  ,ct, • • •  )
where ct is a snapshot of the state at generation t. 
If generation i considers path x to be at 
as path y we write 
xRiy. 
erio 
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Given that each generation has its own preference str:ctrr , an1 
that these preferences are likely to differ because of dif erenm 
vantage points in time among other things, the proble: tb ind II some aggregation function F that takes us from the colleht·on 0£ 
all preference structures, one for each generation, to 
intertemporally social preference ordering: 
Fi(�,R2, • . .  ,Rt, • • •  ) �-� R.
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With this small amount of notation, we can rewrite (1) in a social 
choice context. The intertemporal social preference ordering R 
corresponding to (1) is defined by: 
def. � t-1 t t-1 xRy < � l o  U (x ) > l o  U (y );t - t t=l t=l 
(2) 
and the present value criterion directs us to find a maximal xeE 
under the relation R. 
Thus, the present value approach is subsumed under the 
more general approach of intertemporal social choice, and (2) merely 
defines one aggregation rule among the infinite possibilities. More­
over, the two approaches are fundamentally different in spirit. Under 
the discount criterion, the problem is one of maximization. Translated 
into a market setting, it is necessary to know or estimate future 
prices and other future conditions. Under the social choice approach 
the problem is first one of specifying a rule of aggregation (F). 
As the interest of this paper is on intertemporal equity, the task is 
to specify a fair rule of aggregation. In doing so, it may actually 
be a hinderance to know either present or future interests (or 
preferences). Under a Kantian perspective, one's only hope of 
describing a fair or just rule is to do so without calculating one's 
own or other's interests. For this reason the argument of paternalism 
(C) toward (1) is not forced. Lack of specific knowledge of the 
future's specific interests does not direct us to (1) with the 
first interpretation of the discount criterion; indeed, it favors 
the more general and abstract approach of looking fok rule 
of aggregation. 
We can rewrite the interpretation of selfi'sh il 
with the aid: of (2) as one particular choice of aggr;egalidn: 
F: (�,R2, • • •  ,Rt, • • •  ) -> R = � · IThis will be recognized as a dictatorship of the pr�sen • 1 We Ci 
ask under what conditions is this interpretation foi.ceJ Sine] 
1972 it has been known that in a setting of an infinite l nl.imber 
voters, the Arrow Impossibility Theorem does not hold.,/ In tl!b 
setting, which is a natural one for the intertemp;ral cho ce pj 
where we do not want to have to specify the last generabi n, t� 
A . . f p . 1 1 . . d . 1 1 rrowian axioms o areto, irre evant a ternatives, 'an t ansitt 
are consistent with an infinite number of aggregation rul s thi� 
n=-diotatorial. And quite to the oontrary of the diotlt rahil 
the pr�t whioh ia highly preaent oriented, a1l the .l.n diot� 
ohoioe rulea o�iat�t with the Arrowian �i�a aa;iaf� he o� i 
taking principle, which is highly future oriented, s
.
·
0 �t re o,1
1 that such rules are not appealing as they stand for pract cal a 
�king. N�theleaa, thia olaaa of non-dktatorial1oho�o rul� I 
illustrates an important observation. It is often though tha� 
alternative to discounting at a positive rate of intierjst is t� 
disoo=t at a mo rate of intereat. The aooial ohqiJ f �''I 
illustrates that there are an infinite number of choicJ r les � I 
these two, narrow alternatives. 
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Nor is it necessary to view the choice problem as within 
the context of the Arrowian axioms. As a practical matter we may 
be willing to give up something in the way of narrowing the set 
of possible preference orderings, or the set of feasible alternatives, 
or transitivity, or irrelevant alternatives in order to define rules 
that are not "too" future oriented, and do not depend on the number 
of generations being infinite. For example, as a practical matter, 
we rely heavily, in the intratemporal setting, on majority rule 
voting, even though we know it can be intransitive. It happens 
that the overtaking principle, in the intertemporal context with 
an infinite number of generations, is very much like majority rule, 
favoring infinite majorities of future generations over finite 
minorities of generations near the present. Thus as a practical 
matter we may want to keep some idea of majority rule, in the 
intertemporal setting, even with a horizon of a finite number of 
generations. For example, suppose that the next ten generations 
after us would prefer the resource base kept in some sense intact, 
but the present generation believes that it is intertemporally 
"fair" to follow (1) and exploit the resource base in a way that 
maximizes its present value, but destroys its value for future 
use providing in its stead many freeways and consumer durables. 
The most obvious interpretation of the posited situation is that 
the present has a naive idea of intertemporal fairness, which might 
change upon deeper reflection. Under the more general framework of 
social choice, it is likely to seem unfair to choose an aggregation 
rule that ignores future interests except as reflected ithrbus:l:h 
selfish altruism. A ten-to-one majority is hard to ignore! arld 
14 
some form of intertemporal majority voting, with 11constitutidnal11 
safeguards against the tyranny of the majority, is hard toldismiss 
altogether. 
I 
The approach of intertemporal social choice cons· stts 
of two parts. First, the effort is to define "fair" c�ndilions 
or axioms, which will specify a "fair" aggregation rule F. t 
this stage of consideration a Kantian would find it preferabie 
, I not to know the actual preferences of the future (or the present 
either) . The search is for certain symmetry properties. be4ond, 
after an intertemporal choice rule is defined, such as rsoml 
modified intertemporal majority rule, one tries to sat�s:i;y! tlie 
rule in actual situations. This requires estimating stlreabslof 
I 
costs and benefits into the future, just as in the case ofl (:t.). 
r I .!.� It may or may not require a process of maximization. �or �xq.wple, 
' 9/ a modified majority rule would not require maximization.-
I The Kantian perspective, which ·insists that just 
can only be defined independently from one's own and o�her�' 
interests, underlies the intertemporal social choice arlprolc 
above. "'"'"" <•�rd this Kan<ian per•peotive ia the 11raf 
which the neoclassical approach, taken to be the satisfactio 
, I can be enlarged for a more fundamental discussion of i�terle 
equities. This same Kantian base underlies the Rawlsia'n "or 
position" with its "veil of ignorance. " In both cases,: thl 
es 
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is to search for ethically attractive conditions of symmetry which 
will define decision rules that are thereby just. In both cases 
the future is considered on a symmetrical basis with the present, 
a condition notably absent in the neoclassical (1). 
BASIC GOODS 
I sketch here the second way in which the neoclassical 
perspective can be modified to provide a context for considering 
severance truces and other instruments of intertemporal equity. 
It is convenient to introduce the need for a second change in 
perspective by considering Rawls' chapter on intergenerational 
justice;o/ Hls rule for intertemporal justice is a kind of golden 
rule of savings: One generation should make an effort of savings 
equal to what it would have liked the previous generation to have 
done for it. Capital is viewed in aggregate terms, with natural 
resources lumped together with finished capital, elevators lumped 
together with the energy to run them. Rawls is not alone in this 
view: the assumption that natural resources are just another kind 
of capital has been a very important one in natural resource economics 
in the last forty years. In this respect, in his aggregative approach 
to capital, Rawls appears to be following the neoclassical and 
utilitarian tradition, which he distinguishes himself from in the 
rest of his book. 
In the neoclassical tradition, the obvious instrument of 
intertemporal equity is the discount rate. The neoclassical tradition 
ii 
Ji 
appears to be saying this: we do not believe that thkre I is' 
! 
of intertemporal equity in the sense of protecting th� fut 
we believe that the future is going to be better off thal   
a p
11M[em e, 1:11 use e PJ .�t; 
however, if the present generation decides to (further) im· 
' f 1 lot of the future, it should subsidize the interest rate, ThiJElllis 
the�" g�e<al, and h�ce the�" efficient, _,of + afe,"1g 
wealth from the present to the future. But this conciusio depe 
critically on the assumed homogeneity and aggregabili�y lf capiJI
and other economic goods. 
Many economic goods contribute to a sense or wel -beirt 
without being essential to it. For such goods it is � s� le mll 
conceptually, to define an aggregate value in terms of a c penJ 
variation (or a consumer surplus over compensated deufund c rvesj 
s 
er, 
ing 
I I 
It is quite possible to imagine, for example, that for an "ndiviJ�Ual 
there ;, a certain s� of �y for which the indivf<\\.ai w uld � 
indifferent between having his camera and giving up his ca era J 
gaining the sum instead. 
.rgiti 
le f� 
In contrast to puch "ordinary" economic goo:ds, I otlhers 
have the property of sine qua non. They may trade ati the - - : I but a compensating variation becomes unbounded or indef ina 
: I complete deprivation. For example, suppose the state erro 
imprisons an individual for a few hours, after which [timl I realizes its mistake and attempts to make restitution. We 
that there could be a sum of money which would be ju�t eho 
the individual indifferent between the state not making bh 
eous� 
II he statte  
::
n
Jt::
e 
miJaite 
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in the first place and the state making the mistake but also making 
the compensating restitution. But suppose the state had erroneously 
imprisoned the individual for forty years. Could we call the individual 
irrational if he states that he cannot define a compensating sum that 
would make him indifferent to so much lost life? Similarly, individuals 
are often willing to work at riskier jobs for additional compensation 
(risk premiums) in their wages, as long as the increased risk is in 
some sense marginal, perhaps an extra one out of a thousand chance 
of accidental death per year.1 But the risk premium becomes undefin-
able as the probability of hazard approaches certainty. In the same 
way it is possible to define a compensating variation, and hence a 
valuation, to a common cold but not to terminal cancer. For such 
goods which are essential for a sense of well-being there is no way 
of defining their aggregate value in terms of compensating variations; 
and in this way we can distinguish such goods, which can be called 
basic, from ordinary economic goods. 
Basic goods tend to be the building blocks or requisites 
of other goods. As such they provide opportunities but not guarantees 
of the good life. In Rawls' inquiry into the nature of justice he 
focuses on the fair provision of certian basic goods, notably liberty, 
but also other opportunities. The fair provision, from one generation 
to the next, of the resource base, characterized in terms of materials, 
energy, and space per capita (population), can be looked upon in the 
same light. 
' 
Rawls identifies one of the characteristicsiof Ith 
12/ t 
I 
J.! 
utilitarian tradition as conflation�- which appears to mean a 
tendency toward uncritical aggregation, or "too early!' a�gr gat:i! 
His example is 'he pr�'ice of eerly utilit�iao• to add l u "litJ 
�ro" poople, ., in the -iguo= .tat�t of the "eate ,.JI 
for the greatest number. (Note that the second inter�re�a ion J 
(1) "conflates" utilities across time, but the first ii.ntlr reta� 
does not, as the ooly utility fa for the pl=er.) T�e L gMt� 
here is that the neoclassical tradition conflates ordtinaty econJ�wc 
goods and h"ic good'- A =re critkal vi� of the ,.J, i=• II under which ordinary goods and basic goods are aggregateh rovid
a •�ond path t=ard modification of the nooclas'1ca" p.ls �tJ11, 
It should be no surprise that questions of justice intrah pora�
often focus on the fair provision of certain basic go:odsl atld 
opportunities, and correspondingly in the intertempoi!al ca 
the provision of the resource base, with its implied ioppbr 
THE FEASIBILITY SET 
e of 
uniti 
Just as the intertemporal state of the world cl can be 
disaggregated into a sequence of generational snapshqts [(c ,c
2' � 
reg��
I itie 
) ' 
so too can be the intertemporal feasibility set E beidisag 
into a sequence (E1,E2
, • • •  ) ,  where Et describes the qppobt 
opon to gonerati= t. The intert-oral feasibility ior rp 
set unfolds sequentially and the opportunities availJble t 
t depend upon the specific actions taken by previous [geJer
tion 
1 1 1 ortu� l!t:Y 
gen 
tioJ I
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Previous generations' depletion of materials tends to constrict 
future opportunities, but the use of materials in constructing 
capital instruments, along with advances in education and technology 
may offset, at least in part, this tendency. Neoclassical economists 
have emphasized the substitutability of resources and the enormous 
growth in the power of technology, although other determining factors 
such as population per unit of the resource base, limitations of 
institutional competence, and conditions of social and economic 
bahavior have also received some attention.131 
Further, each generation's opportunity set is bounded 
by the set of physical laws, which do not change from generation 
to generation. There are limits to the efficiency which can be 
designed into an internal combustion engine. Try as we might, 
the performance of car is not going to increase in an unbounded 
way, per unit input. For thousands of years with increasing skill 
and knowledge of the underlying mechanics, boats have been designed 
to move through the water with less effort, but the bow wave is the 
same barrier now as it was for the Pharoahs. Indeed, the less 
understood a physical phenomenon the more scope for technological 
improvement. A physical phenomenon which is completely understood 
and exploited in an engineering sense offers no margin for further 
technological advance. When we are close to understanding, diminishing 
returns set in to further effort in technical design. 
Often a situation is imperfectly understood and it is hard 
to tell what constraints the laws of physics impose. Yet consideration 
,I 
of general principles often suggests a bound, though l it lmav not 
I 
be the lowest bound. A similar problem arises in statisti�s, 
14/ 
•  where ever more efficient estimators are sought. In m
T
1case_ 
consideration of the information inequality provides ' a DO d to
the efficiency, even though this bound may not be thl ldwest 
bound and the most efficient estimator under this boktd lis 
entirely unspecified. 
In recent years more attention in neoclassical econ 
has been placed on the incorporation of general prinliples[, gr I 
enriching the realism of the analysis. This represents l a  third 
broadening of the neoclassical perspective, which can be s 
the work by Kneese and his collegues incorporating i�eaJ o 
! 
en 
ma 
balance into the analysis of pollution problems, and l inl the won 
by Georgescu-Roegen [2] incorporating ideas of therm�dyn cs 
in the analysis of the evolution of economic systems [. 
THE STEADY STATE 
1 
y 
One of the neglected questions in the neoclassic 
tradition 1,, what i• the fair or proper inh�it�k. �t 
to the resource-base, for one generation to pass on �o th 
We can go so far as to suggest that this question ca�ol 
posed in a substantive way under the interpretation kelfisl 
For traditional societies which lived off renewable �esluri 
left the resource base essentially the same from genbralio 
generation, this is not a pressing question.15
1 
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question of the fair inheritance of the resource base is now more 
pressing, due to large scale modification of the resource base 
resulting from our far greater numbers and greater power of technology. 
As we become more cautious about aggregation and more 
willing to keep the difference between ordinary economic goods and 
basic goods in mind, we become less willing to accept uncritically 
the discount rate as the obvious instrument of intertemporal equity. 
Reflection suggests that subsidizing the interest rate can lead to 
a future with a smaller supply of basic goods (and larger supply of 
ordinary goods), beyond the level of sustainability. As aggregate 
investment is stimulated by a general subsidy of interest rates, so 
too are entropic processes, greater reliance on non-renewable 
resources, more depletion, and more throughput. Thus it is entirely 
possible that discount rate subsidy would make the future worse off, 
providing it, figuratively speaking, with more elevators and less 
energy. 
Greater attention to physical laws of nature, especially 
in terms of technical substitutability, and entropic processes of 
depletion and pollution, gives a more realistic description of E, 
the intertemporal feasibility set. A close attention to physical, 
energy, and space constraints provides some understanding of the 
feasibility of sustainable states, at various levels of well-being 
and numbers of people. Given large scale uncertainties, the 
normative problem can be restated as determining what is a fair 
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distribution of risk burden to impose on the future, iherie bart 
of the risk is that even the present level of well-be�nglcahnot 
be sustained. 
The ethical attractiveness of the steady sttte ,ecrnom�
I is that it provides an intertemporal world of equals ;in the bas±, 
goods of energy, materials, and space per capita. As!suJh lit 
provides one solution to the aggregation problem posed � tbe : I 
second section. If each generation is treated the same in �erms 
of its basic opportunities, then, this may be fair enougJ f om J 
intertemporal social choice perspective. A "steady ktale1' is jl 
forever, Georgescu-Roegen points out, but there is a horlat!i.ve 
difference in choosing a path which leads to severe dlsllcaltions 
in 200 years and another which holds a much greater p�sslbijlity 
of tenure for the next 300 million years. It is easyi to it· gine 
a Rawlsian original position with representatives frok all ote��lllal 
generations choosing a steady state path over a non-s�stli�able 
laissez-faire one. 
THE SEVERANCE TAX 
In a narrow neoclassical 
view the severance tax and the percentage depletion 
 
roughly equivalent distortions (though of opposite si�)ton a 
neutral or intratemporally efficient tax structure. 
three changes in perspective outlined above the severknce 
not a similar but an opposite role to the depletion a�loia 
s 
e 
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severance tax decreases the tax burden imposed on the future 
associated with waste generation and depletion and the uncertain 
search for substitutes by decreasing the rates of material and 
energy throughput; the depletion allowance increases the rate of 
depletion, decreases the lead time available for discovery and 
development of substitutes, and increases the risk burden 
associated with the uncertain search for substitutes. With the 
changes in perspective, the severance tax is viewed primarily as 
an instrument of intertemporal equity, nudging the economy toward 
a sustainable path. It focuses on the basic goods of energy and 
materials, which are critical in terms of providing future 
opportunities. The severance tax is just one among many possible 
instruments leading toward a sustainable economy, and if a 
sustainable economy is to be achieved, many or at least several 
instruments will need to be applied simultaneously. Effective 
policies toward the stabilization of population are clearly 
necessary as well, and there should be little doubt that world-
wide resource and political problems would be more tractible 
today if humane policies had been seriously applied fifty years 
ago. 
In Conservation and Economic Efficiency I singled out 
the severance tax as the illustrative policy instrument of inter-
temporal equity for two reasons. First, in dealing with the long 
term management of the material resource base, the severance tax 
appears to be the simplest pricing instrument which fits into a 
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i 
"minimally" modified neoclassical perspective. BesidJs thi 
methodological reason there is a more skeptical and pjactlcal 
reason. As a society we do not deal well with long t�rm, I latent 
problems. We tend to ignore them until they are thru�t upon us. 
As long as there is some easy way to rationalize a laisseb�faire ! I 
approach on the faith that the future will automatica]ly be bette� 
 I II off than we, we are likely to procrastinate. At the presen mome 
we stand bemused in the face of massive energy deplet�on Li h no l l 
really satisfactory substitutes on the horizon; with tlnsu�p rtabl 
population growth and the dawning recognition that paJt tbk n ef �[�ts 
ha� noe be� �ough; with th• world aoonomy inorm+yl b "" �l 
pesticides and other synthetic chemicals, some of whidh the huma� 
species itself may not be able to live with for the lJng be 
In such a world of policy procrastination, Jisclssions 
of intertemporal equity may arouse a modicum of intelJectla 
but at the same time seem abstract without the imminedce bo 
significant preventative action. We are in an internJ peli 
inte 
II gener 
d whi 
 energy, resource, and population problems have not landedl on us  
with their full force. There is time to take action but hott the 
st, 
e 
prov�<te 
diff��ed 
urgency to take strong action. Much of what we do no� isl t 
flexibility and time so that when the blow falls it w:J11 be 
rather than fatal. With this human constraint a usefjl pbllCY 
instrument toward sustainability is one which is of l�ttll Uurdert 
to the present but which accumulates its impact over Jimel. 
! 
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The severance tax has the virtue of low cost to the 
present with the potential of large leverage for the future. 
Consider the elimination of present depletion allowances and 
substitution of national severance taxes of the same percentage 
(roughly 15 to 20 percent) in their stead, phased in over a five 
year period. From a neoclassical perspective, which focuses on 
intratemporal costs (especially under the interpretation of 
selfish altruism), there is little or no distortionary impact 
of trading the allowance for the tax, although there are different 
gainers and losers, intratemporally, and some adjustment costs in 
the transition. On the other hand, a permanent change in the price 
of virgin materials of 30 percent or so would have a strong impact 
on the use and conservation of materials over the long run of fifty 
years or more. As an added advantage the administrative cost of 
a national severance tax is no more than the present system, 
because the administrative apparatus for the depletion allowance 
can be directly transferred to the severance tax without additional 
cost, and the cut off points have been precisely defined over the 
16/ last fifty years.� 
It may be noted in passing that marketable quota 
systems appear to have more political attractiveness when viewed 
for pollution control. The California Air Resources Board has 
recently become interested in a marketable quota system to 
control sulfur pollution in the Los Angeles basin. In this 
case, the rigidity of the number of quota permits is seen as 
a virtue, more nearly guaranteeing a prescribed standdrd bf ! 
I 
air quality, than effluent taxes, which are uncertain!in 
resultant air quality and often disparaged as mere "l:i;cense 
to pollute" (whether the disparagement is just is anotlher 
I 
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matter). Further, preliminary investigation suggests ith
J
t the 
most practical way of implementing a quota system on sulfrr1is t 
establish the quotas at the level of sulfur content of foss 1
fuel•, inolwiing oil '' be refdned luoally in'' gasulj"" �u •�e� 
in the basin and sulfur in gasoline imported into the !regio�,, 
with provision for rebates in quota value for recoverTd 
sulfur in the .basin, such as an electric utility scru�ber 
I 
or desulfurization of fuel oil. (In the control of p911uti�� . 
sometimes the gain in administrative feasibility in d�al�ng 
with the smaller number of firms, closer to the "mine'ls mbuth" 
. I  outweighs the potential loss of efficiency by not re�latiµg at 
h .  f l  h .  ) A  II t e point o re ease to t e environment • quota system 
on sulfur entering the Los Angeles basin in fuels comls d1ose 
to a quota system on the extraction of the virgin matiriJl: 
We can compare the severance tax with its vdrialtJ a 
marketable quota system on the extraction of virgin mJterla1s. 
The principal difference between these two schemes is lthab tlhe 
uncertainty associated with the tax is on the quantit� ofl materia 
extracted from the environment, while the uncertainty lassbc:ilated 
with the quota system is on the market price of the mdterla 
I 
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extracted. With the quantity of material extracted rigidly fixed, 
the quota system is a stronger conservationist measure; but 
unfortunately the quota system involves more short term dislocation 
and cost to the present. For this reason, in the present interim 
period, it appears unlikely to be implemented. 
The case of the severance tax is somewhat different, however. 
Because of some of the potential gainers of the tax are in a position 
to implement it, the severance tax is a rapidly growing tax. The 
mundane reason for the tax's growing use has little to do with 
intertemporal equity. It has more to do with the ease in which 
the tax base can be "exported." For example, in Louisiana where 
oil and gas severance taxes have recently increased, much of the 
oil and gas is sold out of state so that people out of state bear 
much of the burden of the tax. It is little wonder that when 
Governor Edwards offered to the voters a choice between a property 
tax increase and an increase in oil and gas severance taxes, they 
chose the latter. Far from being a drawback of having the tax 
"accepted for the wrong reasons" the main route of success for 
long-term policy instruments is to find harmonies between the 
long term goals and short term interests. 
The real mark of success of the severance tax depends 
on whether or not it is adopted in an internationally coordinated 
system of trade and economic assistance. It happens that many of 
the poor countries depend heavily on their resource extraction 
sector. They are not necessarily resource rich in an absolute 
' 
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sense, but their economies are relatively weighted toJar& tne 
resource sector. At the same time, many of the rich JoJtr:J.es, 
which may be resource rich in an absolute sense, are ltiJl net 
resource importers. Since the Second World War the nikrnJr hf 
buyers has grown relative to the number of sellers, gf v�g tise 
to concern of unstable markets and a "new mercantilisiJi, 11 lrei>lete 
I 
with efforts for special connnodity agreements and the lresulling 
rivalries. Into tld• picture add the "North-South Co�fr+t tion" 
and the demand for a "new economic order," and there lriseslthe 
potential role of a system of internationally coordi�ted s 
taxes, based on mutual interests, intratemporally. FlrsJ o-
It developing countries find severance taxes attractive, 111since 
I I . 
'vera_ 
anll 
they! 
ever transfer wealth from the buyers to the sellers. Moreovel, 
t�e• t'°" to diver•ify the eoonomi� of the poor to�tr,ee� by
making export materials more expensive relative to maJufactured 
other goods. At first glance it might seem that the JuyJrsL the
I I developed countries, would oppose a system of severan9e taxes as 
it involves transfers of wealth from the buyers to thl sJ11ers. 
Upon reflection, however, this might seem a relativelJ cJeai> and' I constructive way of providing economic assistance. The thr at oc 
a new mercantilism would be reduced by adjusting the Jrejen imb� 
between buyere �d eellere, and by stimulating do�•tjt �o �ti� 
conservation and recycling of developed countries. Morelve , th 
North-South tonfrontatiou �uld be ameliorated by tldj 'l't of 
assistance, which in the long run would tend to bring[th� p�or 
e 
.nee 
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countries out of their trap of raw material export dependence. 
And finally, a coordinated system of severance taxes may seem 
better to the developed countries than the present system, with 
its haphazard emergence of severance taxes and other export 
controls, including further attempts at cartelization, which are 
destabilizing even when they fail. 
In this mundane discussion of present interests, nothing 
has been said about the future's interests or intertemporal equity. 
Discussion of the issues of intertemporal equity provides a new 
perspective for sustainable economies and a new role for severance 
taxes and other policy instruments toward this goal. But implement­
ability of such measures.depends on finding a harmony between long 
term goals and short term interests. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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FOOTNOTES 
This is not meant to suggest that all pollution cohtrol 
be "at the end of the pipe" but that in its essent�al 
shou]n 
ture
the pollution problem is a boundary problem. I 
I 
Measures to control the costs of pollution focus o� cha 
the form of the flow, not its volume, which is diclatld 
mass balance and the rates of extraction. Transfobniig 
pollutants into less harmful forms is a worthy ent!erpkii:ie, 
ging 
lby 
 but it is only part of the boundary problem.  
I . The present value criterion is a more or less automatic 
expression of market forces, which lead firms to nkxiiize 
the discounted, or present value of their anticipjtedfp 
strea�. Likewise oo•t-benefit �lysis g�eral.J., d�t 
the maximization of the present value of the net benef i 
stream. For an elementary discussion of this crijeriln 
ofit 
tes 
see [9, pp. 145-167] . 
Consumption of goods in the present is curtailed in favo� ofI I investment, in order to make a larger product in the �utµre, 
and hence a larger sum of present and future utility. I But 
I 
this process does not impoverish the present witho�t 
1. · ·f h · d. · · h. · 1 ·1· f  Ii i: inut i t ere is iminis ing margina uti i.ty, or t e utur: 
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5. Elsewhere Mishan and I discuss some of the fundamental dif-
ficulties of the principle of potential Pareto improvement 
applied intergenerationally. The main difficulty is that a 
potential Pareto improvement becomes infeasible if not 
incorporated into actual Pareto improvement at the initial 
period. See (6). 
6. For the seminal paper on consistency see the first half of [8].
Consistency is defined in the following way. Under some 
criterion a planner chooses, in period one, the best plan, 
which requires certain actions in the first period, and other 
actions in succeeding periods. During the first period some 
actions are taken, and then at the beginning of the second 
period the planner, using the same criterion, but from the 
new vantage point in time and under the changed conditions 
brought about by the passage of time and the planners first 
period actions, chooses a new best plan. If this new plan 
coincides with the continuation of the old plan, than the· 
criterion is said to be consistant. 
7. For example, suppose that this generation has a choice of two 
alternatives, a and b. If the first generation chooses a, the 
second generation can choose c or d, or one of the two paths 
ac or ad. If generation one chooses b, generation two can choose 
e or f, or one of the two paths be or bf. Generation one would 
like to plan for both periods, and its ranking of the 
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two period paths is ac best, then be, ad, and last bf. 
However, generation two's ranking is ad, ac, be, ank lasI I 
bf. If generation one chooses a, desiring ac, gene�atio I I 
two will modify the continuation of the plan to path ad. 
The smaller set of paths that generation two will Jot io�ify 
. ld b '  B . h "  . . 11 I is a , e,1. y construction, c oice is consist nt over 
this smaller set, and generation one is best off b� chlo�ing 
be, which will not later be modified. 
See [3].
generation 
one's c
J
hoice
generation 
tw� ' � choice
l 
I 
I 
I 
Available paths lin l hea 
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Both the National Academy of Sciences and the Counc�l 9n 1wage 
and Prica S<abili<y raco�andad � ovar<aking appro�ch [ i1 <hal 
analyses of the use of granular activated carbon filtratJon o 
carcinogens from drinking water. C • f f l.1 I tl · onstruction o 1 tra ion 
ine. 
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plants would impose costs in the near term, while benefits 
would be delayed forty years and more due to cancer and mutagen 
latency. In order to avoid discounting the value of future 
life over long periods it was recommended that the decision 
be based on current costs and benefits in the steady state 
after adjustment of cancer rates to the proposed action. In 
other words, the indefinitely long future should prevail over 
the transitory present, for this decision involving basic 
health. See [l], [5], and (10]. 
10. Chapter 44 of A Theory of Justice (11].
11. It is usually left unspecified how the interest rate could,
or should, be adjusted. Business income taxes, dividend taxes,
and changes in the supply of money affect interest rates, but
these and other instruments also affect the rate of inflation,
unemployment, and the tax base as well. Because the interest
rate has several important macroeconomic effects, it is unclear
how it could or should be used for the purpose of intertemporal
equity, and how the various effects should be traded off. In
contrast, the severance tax has smaller and more localized "side
effects." Krutilla traces back to Pigou the first suggestion to
use the interest rate adjustment for controlling the use of
natural resources, by the government as "trustee for unborn
generations." Besides suggesting the device of guaranteed
I 
I 
interest, Pigou mentions taxes and State loans as otherI 
I 
possibilities. (conversation with Krutilla, see mo�e
generally [ ] • )
[11], p. 27. I 
4 
 
For example, it is recognized that the difficulty ofl reso�ving 
simultaneous inflation and unemployment constitutes :a rl 
constraint on the opportunities available to societ1 asla lwhole 
and moreover that simultaneous inflation and unemploymeht lin 
part results from economic behavioral conditions of lpribeiand 
wage expectations. 
See [4A] for ' definieion of CUe info-Ci= ineJ•li<y. 
cesh!i Such societies are a prototype of the steady state 1 or1sp 
earth economy described by Boulding and Daly, but it a 1 
of material well-being, and one of the present emplrida1
is at how high a level of material well-being can i mjde on 
wer ��wel 
I quesrm ns
n ve· 
of the steady state economy be achieved. I 
! 
A cut off point at which the market value of the maJerial lis 
the stage of processing -- nine month, benefication j etb. I I 
is taken as a base for the depletion allowance or ftjr the 
severance tax. 
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